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PLAYING WITH FIRE: THE PROPOSED
FLAG BURNING AMENDMENT AND THE
PERENNIAL ATTACK ON FREEDOM
OF SPEECH
The Constitution of the United States, intended to be a perpet-
ual, yet flexible document, contains an internal amendment provi-
sion in Article V. 1 The Article V amendment process serves as a
supreme lawmaking device to remedy perceived injustices, omis-
sions or mistakes.2 Successful amending of the Constitution is ex-
1 See U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V provides in pertinent part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall pro-
pose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing amendments, which,
in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents, and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution,
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conven-
tions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress ....
Id.
2 See Stephen B. Presser, Here Comes the Amendment Jamboree to Put Constitutional
Law Back on Track, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 22, 1995, at 24 (proposing that constitutional
amendments "may be the most promising means of curing our current social ills"); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. I (granting freedom of religion, speech, and press, and right to peacea-
bly assemble); U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV (granting protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting right to trial by jury in criminal cases);
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (securing protection against cruel and unusual punishment); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery); U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV (affording due process
and equal protection of law to all people); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (granting right to vote to
male citizens); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIX (granting right to vote to female citizens); U.S.
CONST. amend. XXIV (disallowing federal and state taxes connected with right to vote). But
see Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Stupidities: A Symposium, The Nominee is... Arti-
cle V, 12 CONST. COMM[ENT. 171, 172-73 (1995) (arguing that provisions of Article V make
constitutional amendments extremely difficult as practical matter, and, noting that
although Constitution has changed through judicial interpretation and political means,
"making amendment easier would have the effect of encouraging additional amendments to
keep the Constitution up to date"). See generally BRUCE AcxERmAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FoUN-
DATIONS 267-68 (1991) (discussing how classical system of "higher lawmaking," Article V
amendment process, Congressional statutes that are supported by President and are
counter to "fundamentals of the pre-existing regime," all raise questions as to which is
proper and necessary amendment process); RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL,
AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE CoNsTrrUTIoN So MUCH, WHY Do WE KEEP TRYING
TO CHANGE IT? 265 (1993) (arguing that "amendment politics" created fervor over flag dese-
cration amendment and detracted attention from truly serious issues confronting the na-
tion); MARY F. BERRY, WHY THE ERA FAMIED: PoLrrics, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, AND THE AMEND-
ING PROCESS OF THE CONsTrrUrION 3 (1986) (arguing that controversial constitutional
amendments require not only support from voters and legislators, but also perception that
urgent societal problem exists); ALAN P. GRUfSs, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONsTrrUTION 166-67 (1978) (stating that democratic nature of amendment politics has re-
suited because amendments are sponsored by victorious coalitions attempting to "secure
their hold on power," employed to attract new voters, and considered extensions of democ-
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tremely rare.3 A proposed constitutional amendment to protect
the American flag, however, appears to have sufficient, if not over-
whelming support to overcome past hurdles and become a reality.4
If passed, such an amendment would represent the first time the
Bill of Rights has been limited by amendment. 5
During the past decade, much controversy has been sparked by
the degree of constitutional protection afforded to those who dese-
crate the American flag for expressive purposes. 6 In Texas v.
Johnson,7 the United States Supreme Court recognized First
Amendment protection for flag burning. Dissatisfied with the out-
racy); JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 173 (1992) (stating that Americans should be able to make any constitutional
changes they desire and concluding that Article V amendment process should not be sub-
ject to substantive limits).
3 See U.S. CONST. amends. I-XXVII (listing only 27 ratified amendments in over 200
years).
4 See Andrew M. Hall, Lusky and the Long Dark Road, 11 J.L. & POL. 213 n.33 (1995)
(quoting Professor Lusky as stating that amendment ratification would be quick, and
would begin "dismal enterprise" of amending Bill of Rights, least popular but most vulnera-
ble part of Constitution because of restraints it imposes upon majority rule); see also Helen
Dewer, Senate Says No to Flag Burning Amendment, Cm. SuN-TnMEs, Dec. 13, 1995, at 3
(noting that after amendment proposal flew through House and fell only three votes shy of
approval in Senate, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) vowed that amendment would be rein-
troduced); Elizabeth Schwinn, Senate Flag-Burning Vote Seen as Too Close to Call: House
Has Already OKCd Proposed Amendment to the Constitution, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 12, 1993, at
A6 (noting that 49 states already have passed resolutions calling for amendment; only 38
are needed to ratify). But see Jeanne Ponessa, Home Panel Approves Measure to Prohibit
Flag Burning, CONG. Q. WKLy. REP., June 13, 1995, at 1646, 1647 (indicating that despite
overwhelming popular support, many Democrats, including President Clinton, oppose flag
desecration amendment because it would infringe on right to free speech); Peter H.
Kostmayer, Risk and Regulation: How Much is Too Much?, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 551, 556
(1995) (noting that in 1990 some Americans began to recognize that amending First
Amendment is unwise); Mike McCurry, Press Briefing, 1995 WL 385862 (White House)
June 29, 1995, at 1, 8 (stating that President Clinton opposes flag desecration amendment
because "the flag is a symbol of our republic, but the Constitution is the soul of our
republic").
5 See U.S. CoNsT. amends. XI-XXVII (ensuring freedom from slavery, right to vote and
right of due process of law, and providing procedures for elections, taxing and impeach-
ment, but never abridging rights secured by Amendments I-X).
6 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, O'er the Land of the Free: Flag Burning as Speech, 37
UCLA L. REV. 925, 947 (1990) (reasoning that use of amendment process to protect against
flag desecration would "have an unhealthy effect on respect for free speech and respect for
the Supreme Court"); Geoffrey R. Stone, Flag Burning and the Constitution, 75 IowA L.
REV. 111, 123-24 (1989) [hereinafter "Flag Burning"] (advocating legislative solutions
before attempting to amend and arguing that amendment to protect against flag desecra-
tion would be undesirable because of infringement upon protected symbolic speech);
Charles Tiefer, The Flag-Burning Controversy of 1989-1990: Congress' Valid Role in Consti-
tutional Dialogue, 29 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 357, 391 (1992) (arguing that Congressional domi-
nance over amendment process must be respected); cf Note, The Faith to Change: Recon-
ciling the Oath to Uphold With the Power to Amend, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1747, 1747 (1996)
[hereinafter "The Faith to Change"] (questioning legislators' ability to uphold Article VI
oath while exercising amendment powers).
7 491 I.S. 397 (1989).
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come in Johnson, Congress responded with the Flag Protection
Act of 1989.8 Not long thereafter, the Supreme Court struck down
the Act in United States v. Eichman.9 This particular struggle, be-
tween the Supreme Court and Congress, is representative of the
country's struggle as a whole. In fact, the actions of the Supreme
Court and Congress have transformed flag desecration from a
First Amendment issue into a topic for the political soapbox.1"
This Note argues that flag desecration constitutes symbolic ex-
pression deserving of constitutional protection. As such, the fed-
eral legislative and the executive branches, and candidates for of-
fices within those branches, risk severe damage to freedom of
speech by supporting and by implementing a flag desecration
amendment. Part I of this Note examines the scope and the appli-
cation of Article V of the U.S. Constitution. This section will enu-
merate the requirements necessary to amend successfully the
Constitution. Part II traces the series of Supreme Court decisions
that extended First Amendment protection to symbolic speech and
scrutinizes the application of First Amendment protection. Part
III follows with a discussion of the Court's application of First
Amendment principles to the issue of flag desecration, reviewing
several cases specifically protecting flag desecration as political
speech. Parts IV and V examine the significant Court decisions
holding legislative efforts to protect the flag unconstitutional.
Part VI discusses the supporting and opposing views concerning
renewed support for a flag desecration amendment. Finally, this
Note concludes that "We the People" must defer to the language of
the Constitution and resist efforts towards permanently altering
the document to prohibit a constitutional, if perhaps unfortunate,
act.
8 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 1990).
9 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
10 See GanmEs, supra note 2, at 25-26 (discussing how politicians muster support for
their campaigns through "amendment politics"). See generally Robert J. Goldstein, The
Great 1989-1990 Flag Flap: An Historical, Political, and Legal Analysis (1990), in 2 THm
CONSTITUTION AND THE FLAG: THE FLAG BURNING CASES 483, 484 (Michael K. Curtis ed.,
1993) (illustrating that Johnson and Eichman decisions, two failed attempts to amend Con-
stitution, and invalidation of Flag Protection Act of 1989 transformed flag burning contro-
versy into highly political issue abused by politicians for self-interested gain).
1996]
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROVISION: ARTICLE V
Although the Framers of the Constitution understood the need
for a flexible document, they also appreciated the need for a last-
ing document upon which to found the nation." To enable future
statesmen to address unforseen circumstances, the Framers in-
cluded Article V, setting forth a procedure to amend the Constitu-
tion.' 2 In order to propose an amendment, Article V requires the
support of either two-thirds of both houses of Congress or two-
thirds of the state legislatures through the calling of a constitu-
11 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). The Court explained that the Fram-
ers performed "a constituent act ... call[ing] into life a being, the development of which
could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of begetters." Id. See generally
Sanford Levinson, Accounting For Constitutional Change (or, How Many Times Has the
United States Constitution Been Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) > 26; (D) All of the Above),
8 CONST. CoMMNT. 409, 422 (1991). Levinson states that "[l]ike most children [the Consti-
tution] could (and did) grow up in ways that might well surprise its parents." Id.
12 See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956). The Court noted the exclusiv-
ity of the Article V amendatory process. Id.; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108
HARv. L. REV. 1221, 1228-45 (1995). Professor Tribe attacks Professors Amar and Acker-
man for their insistence on a "gap" in Article V. Id. at 1244-45. Professor Tribe disagrees
with the notion that because the text of Article V lacks the word "only," the process of
amending the Constitution is open to alternative options. Id. He prefers a strict application
of and adherence to the text of the Constitution, and believes that "[n]on-exclusive views of
Article V... enfeeble.., the Constitution's state-sensitive supermajority requirements for
what should be especially solemn modes of lawmaking, and thereby damage the Constitu-
tion's basic architecture." Id. at 1248.
But see Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1164,
1179, 1181-82 (1988). Professor Ackerman concludes that, in deciding whether to break
sharply with their constitutional past, today's Americans look beyond the classical system
of Article V, heavily relying on the President, entrusting the Constitution to his Court ap-
pointments. Id.; Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L.
REv. 799, 801 (1995). The authors argues that an opening exists in Article V permitting
"higher lawmaking" to occur outside the Article's supermajority criteria. Id.; Akhil R.
Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 457, 458-59 (1994) [hereinafter "Consent of the Governed"]. Professor Amar
writes that Article V "emphatically" does not say that it is the exclusive avenue available to
revise the Constitution, and he cites historical support, including the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, for his proposition that a national referendum to amend the Constitution would
satisfy the questions addressed by the Founders. Id. at 459. He further asserts that, "[wie
the People of the United States have a legal right [retained and unenumerated] to alter our
Government-to change our Constitution-via a majoritarian and populist mechanism
... ." Id. at 458; Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1988) [hereinafter "Philadelphia Revisited"]. Pro-
fessor Amar argues that people retain unenumerated rights beyond Article V to amend the
Constitution. Id.; Sanford Levinson, supra note 11, at 422. Levinson agrees with Professor
Ackerman that the Constitution "has indeed been amended by means other than the addi-
tion of explicit text". Id.; see also Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 HARv. L. REV.
1344, 1356-57 (1990) [hereinafter "Constitutional Stare Decisis"]. This Note compares the
Article V amendment process with stare decisis and judicial amendment, and advocates
strict adherence to stare decisis when considering fundamental constitutional issues. Id.
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tional convention.1 3 These supermajority requirements were in-
tended to avoid whimsical changes to the Constitution.' 4 Once an
amendment has been proposed, three-quarters of the states must
ratify it.15 Of more than 11,000 proposed amendments, only
thirty-three have been submitted to the states pursuant to Article
V, and only twenty-seven of those have been ratified.1 6
In Coleman v. Miller,'7 the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that Article V's amendment power lies exclusively with Congress.
Therefore, the constitutional validity of the process is therefore
considered a political question, not one for determination by the
federal courts.' In fact, four concurring Justices in Coleman sup-
ported granting Congress absolute control over the entire amend-
13 U.S. CONST. art. V; see Katherine Q. Seelye, House Easily Passes Amendment to Ban
Desecration of Flag, N.Y. TnwEs, June 29, 1995, at Al, A19. The only constitutional conven-
tion ever called was convened for the purpose of ratifying the Constitution itself. Id.
See ABA SPECIAL CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDY COMMTMrE, AMENDMENT OF THE
CoNsTrruTION BY THE CONVENTION METHOD UNDER ARTICLE V 59-69 (1971). Of the ratified
amendments, all but the Twenty-First Amendment were ratified by state legislatures,
rather than by constitutional conventions called within the states. Id. However, numerous
states have requested conventions since 1789. Id. at 59-79; see also Michael S. Paulsen,
Rule of Law: The Case for a Constitutional Convention, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1995, at A15.
The author argues that the necessary two-thirds majority of states need to call constitu-
tional convention has been met and that Congress therefore should call one. Id.; cf Clifton
McClenskey, Along the Midway: Some Thoughts on Democratic Constitution-Amending, 66
MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1016 (1968). The author finds that Congress has been wise to keep the
amendment process in check by refusing state calls for a constitutional convention. Id.
14 See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 278-79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(noting that requirements of Article V protect against excessive alteration of Constitution);
see also David E. Kyvig, Refining or Resisting Modern Government? The Balanced Budget
Amendment to the United States Constitution, 28 AKRON L. REV. 97, 98 (1995) (noting that
Framers believed that permanent constitutional alterations should require "widest sanc-
tion of any republican act"); Constitutional Stare Decisis, supra note 12, at 1356 (noting
that process guards against "transitory passions and compels sober consideration by the
polity.... [and that t]his process of deliberation, along with the supermajority provisions,
helps secure broad support and acceptance for constitutional amendments").
15 U.S. CONsT. art. V.
16 See BEmRsTEN & AGEL, supra note 2, at 301-03. Six of the 33 proposals failed to re-
ceive the support of the states. Id. at 301. The six are: a 1789 amendment that would have
increased the size of the legislature with population growth; an 1810 amendment revoking
citizenship of any person accepting a title of nobility from a foreign sovereign; an 1861
Amendment protecting slavery; the child labor amendment of 1924; the Equal Rights
Amendment of 1972; and the District of Columbia Statehood Amendment of 1978. Id. at
301-03; LEE EPsTEIN & THoMAs G. WALKER, CONsTrrITmoNAL LAw FOR A CHANGING
AMERICA 8 (1995) (same).
17 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
18 See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 453-54 (deeming efficacy of ratification by state legislature
which had previously rejected proposal to be "political question"); LAURENCE H. TamE,
AMERICAN CONSTrrIONAL LAw § 3-6, at 65 n.9 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that Supreme Court
has indicated that process of amendment proposal and ratification is committed to Con-
gress exclusively).
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ment process. 19 While Article V empowers Congress to oversee the
amendment process, the Supreme Court is not entirely powerless
in this area.2 ° Since Marbury v. Madison,"1 the Court has enjoyed
the power of judicial review. 22 This power to review the constitu-
tionality of Congressional enactments, while extensive, is not un-
limited.2 3 The Court's role, however, in reviewing amendments to
the Constitution is ill-defined.24
19 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 459 (Black, J., concurring); see Louis Henkin, Is There a 'Polit-
ical Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 613 (1976) (suggesting that Coleman holds that
Article V amending process is under complete control of Congress); cf TRIBE, supra note 18,
§ 3-13, at 101 (doubting whether Coleman can be read to require absolute bar on judicial
review of amendment process); Grover Rees III, Throwing Away the Key: The Unconstitu-
tionality of the Equal Rights Amendment Extension, 58 TEX. L. REV. 875, 888 n.52 (1980)
(disagreeing with Professor Henkin's suggestion that Coleman was not "political question"
case and stating that language of Article V fails to indicate exclusive Congressional control
over amendment process).
20 See TRIBE, supra note 18, § 3-6, at 65 n.9 (noting that even "exclusive" Congressional
control over process need not preclude Supreme Court review of challenged procedures or
actions employed in implementing process).
21 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
22 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 174-79 (vesting Supreme Court with power to review acts of Con-
gress); see BLACK's LAW DIc'rIONARY 849 (6th ed. 1990) (defining judicial review as "[plower
of the courts to review decisions of another department or level of government" (citations
omitted)); EPsTEIN & WALKER, supra note 16, at 872 (defining judicial review as "[t]he au-
thority of a court to determine the constitutionality of acts committed by the legislative and
executive branches and to strike down acts judged to be in violation of the Constitution");
see also Hon. John J. Gibbons, Judicial Review of the Constitution, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 963,
976-77 (1987) (interpreting Supremacy Clause (art. VI, § 1, cl.2), Supreme Court estab-
lished Constitution as supreme law of land to which Justice Marshall's judicial review
must be extended in order to preserve Framers' intent to protect individual liberties from
the "mercies of future legislatures"). Id.
23 See Gibbons, supra note 22, at 985-87. The Supreme Court is limited in its power of
review by certain political constraints. Id. at 986. For instance, the Court's high visibility
opens its decisions to constant scrutiny. Id. Externally, the Court's power is kept in check
by the Article III power of Congress to determine when judicial power shall be exercised.
Id. Through the appointment process the views of the Court as a whole are planned, altered
and updated by the executive and legislative branches. Id. at 986-87.
24 See Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 12, at 1044 n. 1 (discussing possibility of uncon-
stitutional amendments); Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitu-
tional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073-74 (1991) (asserting that amendment cannot alter or
destroy "natural right" retained by people through Ninth Amendment). But see JOHN
AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONsTrrITIONAL DEMOCRACY 107-111 (1984) (rejecting
amendment process as effective check on Court because it is so difficult to effectuate
amendments); ROBERT L. CLINTON, MRBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 98-99
(1989) (noting that "[nlo exclusive power to interpret the fundamental law is claimed for
the court" anywhere in Marbury); 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONsIrrTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.16, 285-86 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that
if Congressional acts do not provide for judicial role in amendment process, maybe all
amendment questions relating to constitutionality of legislation affecting amendment pro-
cess should be categorized as political); cf Gibbons, supra note 22, at 977-85 (discussing
human limitations of Justices and their difficult task of giving meaning to "open-textured"
constitutional provisions).
See also TRIBE, supra note 18, § 3-6, at 65 n.10. Interestingly, four or five Amendments
have been enacted in response to decisions of the Court with which Congress disagreed,
thus establishing limits to the Court's power. Id. Professor Tribe suggests that there have
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Although Article V explicitly enumerates the procedure for
amending the Constitution, it remains uncertain whether the
amendment process can limit or abolish fundamental constitu-
tional rights.25 The Constitution has been altered only seventeen
times since the enactment of the Bill of Rights,26 and none of those
seventeen amendments repealed or revised any portion of the first
ten amendments.27 A most formidable opponent, however, cur-
rently threatens the First Amendment: the proposed Flag Dese-
cration Amendment.28
been five occasions in which amendments successfully have overruled Supreme Court deci-
sions. Id. He cites U.S. CONST. amend. XI (limiting jurisdiction of federal courts in reaction
to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (recogniz-
ing African-American citizens and nullifying Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1856)); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (nullifying Pollock v. Framer's Loan and Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429 (1895), which held federal income tax unconstitutional, overruled by South Caro-
lina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (holding government bond interest not immune from
nondiscriminatory federal tax )); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (setting aside voting age and
nullifying Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (granting wo-
men right to vote and reversing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874)). TRIE,
supra. Unlike the other amendments noted above, the 19th amendment was not widely
perceived as a response to a particular Court decision. Id.; Kyvig, supra note 14, at 98-99.
In the past twenty-five years, an unusually large number of constitutional amendments
have been proposed. Id. These proposals have addressed issues such as abortion, school
prayer, flag desecration, equality for women, federal representation for the District of Co-
lumbia, congressional pay and a balanced budget. Id.
25 See The Faith to Change, supra note 6, at 1748-49 (noting that, if procedural require-
ments of article V are met, amendment is legitimate regardless of substance or wisdom);
see also R. ALLEY, SCHOOL PRAYER 204-05 (1994) (discussing previous attempts to amend
Constitution with regard to freedom of religion and association, and noting that last of
many recurring attempts for school prayer amendment, which occurred in 1984, fell just 11
votes short of necessary two-thirds majority for Senate approval).
26 U.S. CONST. amends. XI-XXVII.
27 See G. Calvin Mackenzie, Senator George Mitchell and the Constitution, 47 ME. L.
REv. 163, 174 (1995). Senator Mitchell believes that the Bill of Rights should never be
amended because it is "so effective in protecting individual liberty of Americans precisely
for its unchanging nature. Once that is unraveled, its effectiveness will be forever dimin-
ished." Id.; Rhonda McMillion, Star Spangled Skirmish: ABA Opposes Congressional At-
tempts to Pass Flag-Desecration Amendment, 81 A.B.A. J. 110, 110 (1995). McMillion as-
serts that a flag desecration amendment would give great power to state and local
governments to create a "patchwork of flag laws to restrict the Bill of Rights." Id.; Chris
Harvey, Amendment to Shield Flag Fails in the House, WASH. TmEs, June 22, 1990, at Al.
Even for the flag, the House refused to alter the Bill of Rights for first time. Id.; see also
BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 2, at 191. Opponents of the proposed flag desecration
amendment are also concerned with the seeming revival of the old common law crime of
seditious libel, under which one could be punished for criticizing the government regardless
of the truth of the criticism. Id.
28 See S.J. Res. 332, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S8632 (1990).
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II. SYMBOLIC SPEECH: THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment protects, among other rights, the right to
freedom of speech. 29 Since the decision in Stromberg v. Califor-
nia,3 0 the Court has expanded speech beyond written and spoken
words to encompass symbolic conduct.31 For example, the First
Amendment protects one displaying a red flag in support of Com-
munism 2 Protection has been extended to a student wearing a
black armband in school in protest of United States involvement
in the Vietnam War.3 Wearing an American military uniform in a
play criticizing United States military involvement in Vietnam
has been protected. 34 The First Amendment also protects partici-
pants in sit-ins protesting segregation 35 and picketers protesting
the conduct of a business.36 Failing to pledge allegiance to the flag
in public school, 37 and burning a draft card38 have also been con-
sidered expressive forms of conduct.
29 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech. . ." Id.
30 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
31 Id. at 369-70 (holding that hanging of communist flag contained some elements of
speech and was therefore protected as expression of political idea); see also GERALD GUN-
THER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INDImvmuAL RIGHTS IN CONSTrruIONAL LAw 832-33 (2d ed.
1976) (discussing historical development of symbolic behavior as form of speech); ROBERT F.
LADENSON, A PHILOSOPHY OF FREE ExPRESSIoN AND ITS CONSTrrUTIONAL APPLICATIONS 65-
69 (1983) (tracing development of symbolic speech).
32 See Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369-70 (invalidating state statute that prohibited display
of red flag).
33 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding that
wearing of black armbands by student on school grounds in protest of Vietnam War was
protected form of expression).
34 Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970) (permitting actor to wear uniform to
protest government).
35 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (offering First Amendment protection
to peaceful sit-in at segregated library). But see Clark v. Commission for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1984) (holding that National Park Service regulation
prohibiting camping in certain parks did not violate First Amendment).
36 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-03 (1940) (striking down state statute prohib-
iting picketing). But see International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284, 294-95 (1957) (picketing not protected if in furtherance of illegal activities).
37 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). The decision
invalidated a state statute that ordered public school children to pledge allegiance to the
flag daily. Id. The Court noted that "[slymbolism is a primitive but effective way of commu-
nicating ideas." Id. at 632. The Court decided that the Constitution will tolerate suppres-
sion of expression only when the expression presents a "clear and present danger" of action
that the state is empowered to prevent and punish. Id. at 633. The dissent in Barnette
urged a lower standard of review, stating that the Court should not second guess the states
by "mak[ing] psychological judgments as to the effectiveness of a particular symbol in (in-
culcating) concededly indispensable feelings ..... Id. at 662 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
cf James R. Dyer, Comment, Texas v. Johnson: Symbolic Speech and Flag Desecration
Under the First Amendment, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 895, 900-01 (1991). The author notes
that the Barnette Court's likely, global awareness that fascist movements, especially the
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Once the Court finds certain conduct to be expressive, however,
the question remains whether that expressive conduct warrants
First Amendment protection. 9 In United States v. O'Brien,4 ° the
defendant, who publicly burned his draft card, challenged a fed-
eral statute4 1 prohibiting the destruction or the mutilation of a
Selective Service certificate.42 O'Brien argued that his actions
were expressive in nature and therefore protected by the First
Amendment.43 The Court set forth a four-part test to determine
whether a statute unconstitutionally prohibits expressive con-
duct.44 In order to pass constitutional muster, the statute must be
within the constitutional power of the state; it must further a sub-
stantial governmental interest; it must be unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and, any incidental restrictions on
First Amendment freedom in furtherance of the governmental in-
terest must not be greater than those which are essential.45 The
O'Brien Court applied the test to determine whether the federal
statute was constitutional after the Court preliminarily deter-
mined that burning a draft card had a sufficiently "expressive ele-
ment."46 The Court held that the government's interests were suf-
ficient to justify the prohibition of such conduct.47
Nazis in Germany, were characterized by their creation of flags and passed laws command-
ing behavior with regard to those flags, may have influenced the decision. Id.
8 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (government interest in Selective
Service efficiency precluded First Amendment protection for burning of draft card).
39 See Srikanth Srinivasan, Incidental Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment:
A Motive Based Rationalization of the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence, 12 CONST. COM-
mmNT. 401, 401-02 (1995). The Court has not established a blanket rule concerning the
speech restrictive effect of incidental restraints. Id. at 403-05. 'iTihe First Amendment im-
plications of incidental restraints apparently depend upon the character of the activity that
'draws' the law's application in any particular case: Only if [enforcement of the speech-
restrictive provision] trigger has 'a significant expressive element' does the law raise First
Amendment concern." Id. at 409 (quoting Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697, 706-07
(1986)).
40 391 U.S. at 367.
41 Universal Military Training and Service Act, § 12, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 462(b) (West
1990).
42 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369-70.
43 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370 (1968).
44 Id. at 376-77.
45 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
46 Id. at 376.
47 Id. at 377-78. The government's interest in keeping records and organizing an efficient
draft outweighed the incidental restriction on speech. Id. at 377-82. The Court concluded
that the law was aimed at non-speech conduct, but destruction of a draft card seems inher-
ently expressive. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some
Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 Sup. CT. REv. 1,
34. Professor Tribe suggest that violations of a ban on draft card destruction will almost
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The O'Brien Court acknowledged that the First Amendment
does not protect all forms of expressive conduct.48 Courts must ap-
ply the O'Brien test to identify those statutes which violate pro-
tected First Amendment rights.49 In practice, the O'Brien test has
become two pronged. First, the Court determines whether the
statute is content-neutral or content-based. 0 This distinction de-
pends upon the statute's relation to the suppression of expres-
sion.51 If, however, the statute is deemed content-based it usually
will trigger the implementation of a strict scrutiny standard of
constitutional review.5 2 If the statute is deemed content-neutral,
it will provoke a lower level of constitutional review.5 3
Therefore, the paramount issue underlying the flag desecration
controversy is whether flag desecration, an act that the Court has
repeatedly deemed expressive and deserving of First Amendment
protection, is sufficiently special to warrant an exception to the
protection granted by the First Amendment. 4
always be expressive, except for the "odd soul who burns a draft card just to stay warm or
to light up his campsite." Id.
48 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
49 Id.
50 See David R. Fine, Comment, Symbolic Expression and the Rehnquist Court: The Les-
sons of the Peculiar Passions of Flag Burning, 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 777, 783 n.32 (1991). If a
statute is content-neutral it needs to pass only a deferential means-ends test. Id. If it is
content-based it must pass strict First Amendment scrutiny." Id.; see also TRmE, supra
note 18, § 12-8, at 832-33. Professor Tribe agrees with this approach. Id.
51 See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 46,
48-50 (1987) (describing various categories of speech recognized by Supreme Court); Geof-
frey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189,
190-97 (1983) [hereinafter "Content Regulation"] (discussing distinction between content-
based and content-neutral laws).
52 See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642, 657-61 (1994) (declining to
apply strict scrutiny to broadcasting "must-carry" rules that are content-neutral); Cary v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) (carefully scrutinizing Illinois residential picketing
statute); Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (carefully scrutinizing Chicago
school picketing statute).
53 See Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 662-68 (applying intermediate scrutiny to content-
neutral statute); see also Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 51, at 190-94 (content-neu-
tral regulations will be upheld if limitations on speech do not outweigh "substantial inter-
ests" of government and there is no less intrusive means available to government).
54 See The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, [hereinafter "Leading Cases"]
103 HARv. L. REV. 137, 249-50 (1989). The emotional reaction of the nation "reflects a
deeper constitutional debate arising from alternative philosophical visions of the appropri-
ate balance to be struck among competing first amendment values." Id. at 250; see also
Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 943-44 (suggesting that flag should enjoy exception from First
Amendment scrutiny). But see id. at 944-46 (asserting five interests in preserving the right
to burn the flag: (1) preserving the right to burn the flag reflects our commitment to free
speech; (2) protecting the symbol weakens its symbolic value; (3) attaching a "nonrational
reverence" to the flag subjects us to manipulation by those who control it; (4) venerating the
flag may cause reverence for it to become a substitute for critical thought about govern-
1996] PLAYING WITH FIRE
III. Flag Desecration as Expressive Conduct
Between 1959 and 1974, the Court was presented with three
occasions to address the issue of flag desecration. 55 In each in-
stance, the Court invalidated the state's flag desecration or misuse
statute on narrow grounds without directly addressing whether
flag desecration constituted symbolic speech protected by the First
Amendment. 56
The first case was Street v. New York. 57 Street had publicly
burned an American flag upon learning of the murder of civil
rights activist James Meredith. 8 Street was convicted under a
New York statute which declared it a misdemeanor to "publicly
mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt
upon either by words or act [any flag of the United States]."59 By
declaring the statute invalid on its face, the Court avoided the is-
sue of whether flag burning was constitutionally protected
speech.60 The Court found that the wording of the statute allowed
an offender to be punished for showing contempt for the flag by
ment policy; (5) allowing the flag to represent particular values may lead, or already have
led, to those values being too highly regarded).
See Steven Chapman, A Flag-Burning Amendment Would Singe Our Principles, CH.
Tlm., Mar. 5, 1995, at 3. The Citizens Flag Alliance can cite only three incidents of flag
burning since the last flag burning amendment was proposed in 1990. Id.; Amendment Bid
Revived on Flag Burning, BOSTON GLOBE, May 25, 1995, at 10. Rep. John Conyers cites
fewer than forty-five reported flag burnings in our history. Id.
55 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974) (per curiam) (improper use of flag to
tape on peace sign); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 566 (1974) (misuse of flag to sew flag
patch into seat of pants); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 578 (1969) (burning of flag in
protest of civil rights leader's murder).
56 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-10 (applying full First Amendment analysis, but carefully
limiting holding to display of altered flag); Goguen, 415 U.S. at 578-79 (reversing conviction
because of vagueness of statute); Street, 394 U.S. at 585-88 (concluding Street may have
been convicted solely on words and reversing); see also John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Des-
ecration: A Case Study in the Roles and Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1482 (1975) (noting these three occasions which Court "on
one narrow ground or another, has avoided definitively ruling on the constitutionality of
the convictions for politically inspired destruction or alteration of the American flag"); Ger-
ald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the 'Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expe-
diency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 16-20 (1964) (critiquing Court's deference
to Congress by making narrow decisions or avoiding controversial ones).
In Spence, Smith and Street, at least three justices dissented, foreshadowing the 5-4 split
to come in Texas v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 397 (1989) and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S.
310 (1990). See Sheldon H. Nahmod, The Sacred Flag, 66 IND. L.J. 511, 516 (1991) (discuss-
ing precedential foreshadowing of Johnson).
57 394 U.S. at 576; cf Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 45-46 (1907) (upholding Ne-
braska flag burning statute as constitutional before First Amendment was made applicable
to states).
5 Street, 394 U.S. at 578.
59 Id. at 578 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1425(16Xd) (1909)).
60 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 591 (1969).
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either words or acts.61 Thus, because the statute could be violated
by the use of mere words, the Court struck it down as an over-
broad limitation upon free speech. 2
The Court revisited the flag desecration issue in Smith v.
Goguen.63 Goguen was convicted for publicly wearing an Ameri-
can flag sewn into the seat of his pants.64 The Court again skirted
the expressive conduct issue, instead holding that the statute
under which Gougen was convicted was irreparably vague as to
what constituted impermissible treatment of the flag.65
In Spence v. Washington,6 6 the Court established a two-part test
for identifying symbolic speech or expressive conduct worthy of
constitutional protection. 67 The Spence test is used to determine if
expressive conduct exists; while the O'Brien test is used to deter-
mine the level of scrutiny and the government interest to justify
the statute. In Spence, the Court addressed the constitutionality
of an improper use statute.68 Spence affixed a peace symbol to an
American flag and draped it outside his apartment window in pro-
test of the United States' invasion of Cambodia and the Kent
State killings.6 9 First, the Court examined the actor's intent to
communicate a particular message, and then, given the circum-
stances surrounding the conduct, the probability that the in-
tended message would be understood by those present to receive
it. 70 The Court found the appellant's message to be particularized
and recognizable, and consequently held his conduct to be within
the scope of First Amendment protection.7 '
61 Id. at 581.
62 Street, 394 U.S. at 590. The Court also rejected the argument that such words could
constitute "fighting words." Id. at 592.
63 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
64 Id. at 568-69. The statute punished "[wihoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon,
defaces or treats contemptuously the flag of the United States . . . whether such flag is
public or private property.. . ." Id. (quoting MAss. GEN. L. ch. 264, § 5 (Supp. 1973)).
65 Id. at 567-68, 579. This vagueness was primarily found in the "treats contemptuously"
language of the statute. Id. at 569.
66 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
67 Id. at 414.
68 Id. at 406-07 (citing Washington Improper Use Statute, WASH. REv. CODE § 9.86.020)
(1970).
69 Id. at 405, 407-08. Here, the flag was not destroyed or desecrated, but rather it was
"misused." Id. at 407. The defendant used tape to affix the symbol, specifically to avoid
permanent injury to the flag. Id. at 408.
70 Id. The Court found Washington's "improper use" statute unconstitutional as it ap-
plied to the petitioner, because he intended to convey a particularized message which,
under the circumstances, was likely to be understood by those who viewed it. Id. at 410-11.
71 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (per curiam).
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IV. Flag Burning Cases
Until 1989, lower courts were divided over the constitutionality
of flag protection statutes.72 In 1989, however, the Supreme Court
squarely addressed the issue in Texas v Johnson.73 By the time
the Court heard Johnson, forty-eight states 74 and Congress 75 had
enacted statutes criminalizing flag desecration.
In Johnson, the defendant was charged with violating Texas'
"Desecration of a Venerated Object" law76 which deemed it a mis-
72 See Fine, supra note 50, at 781-82 (citing examples of lower court inconsistencies).
Compare United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1972) (upholding flag-burning
conviction), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Iowa v. Farrell, 223 N.W.2d 270 (Iowa 1974)
(same), dismissed, 421 U.S. 1007 (1975), with Bowles v. Jones 758 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir.
1985) (overturning conviction for flag burning); Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1988) (same); see also Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531, 531 (1971) (avoiding
First Amendment issue and affirming on lower court's finding of substantial governmental
interest in preserving peace); Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 45-46 (1907) (upholding
state statute prohibiting use of flag for advertising purposes).
73 491 U.S. 397 (1989); see Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 927 (questioning Court's choice
of Johnson, which had attracted little attention, to reverse its prior course of issue avoid-
ance, and commenting on relatively trivial nature of case because flag burning incidents
are so rare); Tiefer, supra note 6, at 362 n.22 (noting dearth of amicus briefs, including
none by United States, despite potential implications of decision).
74 See, e.g., Asuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3703 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-51-207 (1990);
CAL. MEL. & VET. CODE § 614 (Deering 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-11-204 (1990); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1331 (1990); FLA. STAT. § 876.52 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-9 (1990);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 711-1107 (1990); IDAHO CODE § 18-3401 (1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1, 9
3351 (1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-4 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE § 32.1 (1989); KAN. Clam
CODE ANN. § 21-4111 (Vernon 1988); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 525.110 (Baldwin 1988); L..
REV. STAT. ANN. § 116 (West 1989); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 83 (1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 264, § 5 (Law. Co-op. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-7-39 (1990); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 578.095 (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 97-7-39 (1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-928 (1989); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.290 (Michie 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-21-4 (1990); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAw § 136 (McKinney 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-381 (1990); Oio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2927.11 (Baldwin 1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2102 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-15-2
(1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-9-1 (1990); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.14 (Vernon
1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-601 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-488 (1990); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.86.030 (1990); W. VA. CODE § 61-1-8 (1990); Wis. STAT. § 946.05 (1988); see also
Fine, supra note 50, at 780 n.13. These state laws have not been repealed, though an at-
tempt to enforce them would likely be held unconstitutional under Johnson and Eichman.
Id.
Five of the states retaining their flag desecration laws still include as protected the flag
of the Confederate States of America. See ARY. STAT. ANN. § 1-5-107 (1990); FLA. STAT.
§ 256.051 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-9 (1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116 (West 1989);
MIsS. CODE ANN. § 97-7-39 (1990). See generally Albert M. Rosenblatt, Flag Desecration
Statutes: History and Analysis, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 193-237 (discussing state flag
desecration statutes and how courts have applied them).
75 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1979); see also NATIONAL FLAG CODE, ch. 435, § 1-5, 56 Stat. 377
(1942) (codified as amended at 36 U.S.C. § 173-77 (1988)) (codifying flag etiquette).
76 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1974). Before amendment the Texas statute
provided:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag.
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demeanor to "desecrate" the flag in a manner likely to "seriously
offend" onlookers.77 Johnson had burned an American flag during
the Republican National Convention to protest the agenda of Pres-
ident Ronald Reagan's administration, 8 while approximately one
hundred other protesters chanted, "America, the red, white and
blue, we spit on you.
"79
First, the Court questioned whether flag burning constituted
"expressive conduct" ° sufficient to constitute speech and invoke
First Amendment protection.81 Applying the test set forth in
Spence,8 2 the Court questioned whether Johnson intended to par-
ticularize a message, and whether that message was likely to be
understood. 3 The majority, weighing heavily the overtly political
context of the burning, found that First Amendment expression
rights were indeed at issue.8 4
Next, the Court balanced the interests of the state against the
rights of the individual.8 5 Applying the O'Brien test," the Court
(b) For purposes of this section, "desecrate" means deface, damage, or otherwise physi-
cally mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons
likely to observe or discover his action.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
Id. After Johnson, the legislature slightly amended the law. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 42.14 (Vernon 1989).
77 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1974); see Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408. Several
witnesses testified that they were seriously offended by Johnson's act. Id.; Nahmod, supra
note 56, at 516 n.30. The author asserts that even though the Texas statute was based
upon offense to others, it is doubtful that a flag statute could ever be content-neutral or
viewpoint-free. Id. The criterion of offense to others makes the desecration non-private in
nature. Id. at 517 n.34.
78 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
79 Id. Following the burning, an Army Corps of Engineers employee collected the ashes
and buried them quietly in his backyard. Id.
80 Id. at 404, 409-10. The Court examined Spence v. Washington, 481 U.S. 405 (1974)
and Stromberg v. California, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). Id. The Court also noted that symbols are
'a short cut to the mind." Id. at 405 (quoting West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632
(1943)).
81 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403; see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (dis-
cussing First Amendment protection of expressive conduct).
82 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
83 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989).
84 Id.; cf Nina Kraut, Speech: A Freedom in Search of One Rule, 12 T.M. COOLEY L. REv.
177, 186 (1995). Professor Kraut would have taken Justice Holmes' "single rule" approach
to First Amendment protection. Id. She suggests that under the "single-rule" theory, once
the Court deemed Johnson's flag burning activity to be expressive and worthy of protection
under the free speech clause, the Court simply could have focused on whether Texas' inter-
est was sufficient to infringe upon Johnson's choice of medium. Id. at 188. Professor Kraut
believes that if this theory were implemented, the Court's discussion would have been more
economical and effective, thereby eliminating discussion of "content-based or neutral, or
viewpoint-based or neutral." Id. at 189, 192.
85 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407; see O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. Under the O'Brien test, a
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it fits within the constitutional power of
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examined Texas' asserted justifications for the statute, namely
keeping the peace and preserving the flag as a symbol of American
unity. 7 The Court found neither actual danger"" nor threat of a
breach of the peace in the petitioner's conduct, because it was
neither "directed to inciting or producing" nor "likely to incite or
produce" imminent violence.8 9 The majority summarily rejected
the government's contention that burning the flag constituted
"fighting words," an unprotected category of speech.90 The Court
found that Johnson's act was neither a direct, personal insult nor
the government, furthers an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of free expression, and the incidental infringement upon the individual's
first amendment rights is minimal. Id. But see FRANKLYN S. H mAN, "SPEECH AcTs" AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 18 (1993). Haiman criticizes the Court's use of the O'Brien test in
cases where individuals burn their own flags. Id. He claims the act "is as much speech and
as little action as an oration or an editorial verbally condemning the flag." Id. Therefore, he
contends, "the conduct, though nonverbal, is essentially symbolic and [ ] the same First
Amendment tests that are used in cases of verbal communication should apply." Id.; Ely,
supra note 56, at 1487. Ely argues that, in O'Brien, the government kept its own records
and, therefore, its interest in having individuals carry draft cards was insubstantial. Id.
86 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.
Under the third criterion of the test, the Johnson Court inquired as to whether the state
interest in convicting was "unrelated to the suppression of expression." Id.
87 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989).
88 Id. at 409 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (requiring that
"actual danger" be created by expressive conduct for such conduct to be unprotected)).
89 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 574 (1942)).
90 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409. The Court narrowly construed its view of"fighting words" to
"a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs." Id. See generally, TimE,
supra note 18, § 12-10, at 849-56. The Court decided that flag burning did not constitute
"fighting words" so as to fall outside First Amendment protection. Id. But see Johnson, 491
U.S. at 431 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that burning
the flag is akin to "fighting words" because of its slight social value. Id.
In addition, they rejected the state's argument under the "hostile audience" doctrine. Id.
Under this doctrine, the state may punish speech only if it presents a "clear and present
danger" of an imminent, violent audience response. Id.; see Feigner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315, 320-21 (1951) (addressing directly issue of hostile audience and upholding arrest as
effort to prevent threatened violent reaction of audience); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 310 (1940) (reversing convictions for breach of peace where there was no record of
threat of harm or personal abuse); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring) (arguing that "[o]nly an emergency can justify repression"). See gener-
ally ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING My ENEMY: AMERmcAN NAzis, THBE STOUE CASE, AND THE
RiSKs OF FREEDOM 123-24, 141-42 (discussing "clear and present" danger test in Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), and its subsequent application); JOHN E. NowAK & RON-
ALD D. ROTUNDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 16.39-16.40 (4th ed. 1991) (tracing development
of hostile audience doctrine and subsequent cases possibly overruling Feigner); GEOFFREY
R. STONE, ET AL., CONsTrruTiONAL LAw 1025-1040 (1991) (discussing dangerous ideas and
expressions that induce unlawful conduct); Flag Burning, supra note 6, at 115-16 (distin-
guishing Johnson situation from one in which narrow "hostile audience" doctrine would
apply).
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an invitation to engage in physical confrontation and, therefore, it
did not constitute "fighting words."9
Because it was aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the
flag in situations involving expressive conduct, the Court deemed
the Texas statute content-based and subjected it to strict scru-
tiny.92 The Court found the state's asserted interest in preserving
national unity insufficient to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard.
93
Thus, the Court struck down the statute.94
The four dissenting Justices asserted that the act of flag burn-
ing was non-expressive. s5 Instead of applying the O'Brien test and
waging war on the First Amendment analysis of the majority, the
dissenters examined the flag as a unique, patriotic symbol. 96 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and O'Connor, cited
Ralph Waldo Emerson's "Concord Hymn," Francis Scott Key's
91 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409. "No reasonable onlooker would have regarded Johnson's
generalized expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal Government as a
direct insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs." Id.; cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
16 (1971) (refusing to extend state power to limit "indecent speech" to punish person for
publicly wearing jacket inscribed with "Fuck the Draft"); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197,
1199 (7th Cir.) (striking down Skokie, Illinois village ordinance which prohibited all public
demonstrations which "incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward a person or group
of persons by reason of reference to religious, ethnic, national or racial affiliation"), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE ToLERANT SocIETY 31-
32, 179-81, 197-200 (1986) (discussing fighting words issue in Chaplinasky, Collin and Co-
hen); NE ER, supra note 90, at 52-53, 137-39, 141-42 (same).
92 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411 (1989). The majority believed that the exemption
for burners of old and soiled flags made the statute content-based. Id.; see 36 U.S.C.
§ 176(k). 'The flag, when it is in such condition that it is no longer a fitting emblem for
display, should be destroyed in a dignified way, preferably by burning." Id.
93 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988) (stating that when laws that place
restrictions on expression cannot "be justified without reference to the content of the regu-
lated speech," they are to be subjected to "the most exacting scrutiny" (quoting Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1978))); see
also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) (scrutinizing carefully Illinois residential
picketing statute); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (stating that
'above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict ex-
pression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content").
94 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414. The Court declared, "[w]e do not consecrate the
flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished
emblem represents." Id. at 420. The Court noted that Texas could have charged Johnson,
who had stolen from a bank the flag he burned, with a crime other than flag desecration.
Id. at 418.
95 Id. at 430-32 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (labeling Johnson's act "equivalent of an
inarticulate grunt or roar that.., is most likely to be indulged in not to express an idea,
but to antagonize others").
96 Id. at 422-23 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (focusing on flag as unique symbol worthy
of special protection); Id. at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same). See generally Fine, supra
note 50, at 790 (comparing majority's focus on state interests and First Amendment with
minority's focus on flag as unique symbol); James McBride, 'Is Nothing Sacred?": Flag Des-
ecration, the Constitution and the Establishment of Religion, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 297,
311-14 (1991) (noting that majority and dissenters in Johnson utilized different
approaches).
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"Star Spangled Banner," and John Greenleaf Wittier's "Barbara
Friechie" in an effort to convey their strong feelings for the flag.9 7
Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist justified the Texas statute by
invoking the flag's historical strength in times of both war 98 and
peace.99 Further, the Chief Justice asserted that the flag should be
protected because of its "uniqueness," arguing that the United
States possessed a private property right in the flag. 100 He urged
that the United States government has the power to prevent con-
duct that has no social value and, like fighting words, can incite
breaches of the peace. 101 Rehnquist also pointed to the Framers'
intent to protect the flag, not merely for its symbolic value, but for
97 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 422-25, 429 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The
Chief Justice saw the flag as a "visible symbol embodying our Nation" regarded "with an
almost mystical reverence." Id. at 429. But see Robert J. Goldstein, The Great Flag Flap, 45
U. MLAu_ L. REv. 19, 36-37 (1990) (providing various indications of lack of passion for flag);
Arnold H. Loewy, Essay, The Flag Burning Case: Freedom of Speech When We Need It
Most, 68 N.C. L. REv. 165, 169 (1989) (sarcastically attacking Chief Justice Rehnquist's
sentimentalism).
98 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 425-26; see Tiefer, supra note 6, at 374-76 (illustrating impor-
tance of flag from Civil War era to as recently as reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in 1987).
99 Texas u. Johnson, 391 U.S. 397, 426-27. But see Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 938
(arguing that Chief Justice Rehnquist's property and sovereignty arguments quickly be-
came argument for government to possess power to preserve flag as symbol).
100 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 429-30. (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (arguing that if Congress
has power to license words such as "Olympic," it can award congressional protection to
symbols as well) (citing San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987)). See generally Dyer, supra note 37, at 916 (discussing Johnson
dissents and "mystical reverence" for flag in American thinking). But see Ely, supra note
56, at 1505. "The cloth, in such a case, is surely the disfigurer's alone. And while the ideas
it represents just as surely are not, neither are they the exclusive property of the govern-
ment." Id.; Dilan A. Esper, Some Thought on the Puzzle of State Action, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
663, 676 n.65 (1995). "If the Court subjected private conduct to serious constitutional scru-
tiny, large holes might be punched through important constitutional guarantees by amend-
ment." Id.
101 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 430-31 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued
for "fighting words" treatment of flag burning, a distinction that would remove such con-
duct from the First Amendment's protections. Id. at 431. He stated that, like Chaplinsky's
provocative words, Johnson's conduct is "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
[is] of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that might be derived from
[it] is clearly outweighed' by the public interest in avoiding a probable breach of the peace."
(quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Id.; see Eric J. Segall,
The First Amendment in a Justice Rehnquist World, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 825,826 n.8 (1995).
The author notes that Justice Rehnquist was the only member of the Court to vote both to
uphold the anti-flag burning law, and, in another case, to strike down an anti-hate speech
law on the basis that a state cannot prohibit only race-based fighting words. Id. In Rehn-
quist's world, the states could legally outlaw flag burning as a means of demonstrating
political disapproval, but they could not prohibit the burning of a cross demonstrating ra-
cial hatred. Id. at 826.
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its practical uses. 10 2 Finally, the Chief Justice asserted that the
Court's decision ran contrary to the will of the majority. 10 3
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, joined in the uniqueness
argument of Chief Justice Rehnquist but, in addition, he focused
on Johnson's conduct. 10 4 Justice Stevens believed that the Texas
statute penalized Johnson not for his "disagreeable ideas," but for
his "disagreeable conduct."10 5 He compared Johnson's conduct to
spray-painting the Lincoln Memorial.10 6 Commentators have
noted, however, that this analogy failed to address the obvious dif-
ference in ownership of a public monument and a private flag.10 7
The First Amendment was safe, but not for long.
V. THE AFTERMATH OF JOHNSON
The American public was outraged by the Johnson decision.' 08
Immediately following the decision, more than seventy percent of
Americans polled favored a constitutional amendment to set aside
102 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 379, 422 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing his-
torical importance of flag for identifying trade and war ships); see also, e.g., Tiefer, supra
note 6, at 368-72. During the American Revolution, American vessels sailed under an au-
thorized national flag. Id. at 369. The establishment of the Navy was closely tied to estab-
lishing and protecting that sovereign flag. Id. at 370.
103 Johnson 491 U.S. at 435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See generally Leading Cases,
supra note 54, at 253-59. The author's argument initially supports Rehnquist's dissent in
that, under a communitarian view, self-fulfillment in society "depends upon an ability to
participate filly as a member" of certain groups, and the government's function is to aid
the groups, not individuals, in their development. Id. at 254-55. However, to be an "Ameri-
can," one would certainly have to embrace "American values," one of which is certainly
respect for the First Amendment. Id. at 258.
104 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 438 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 436 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens believed that the
content of Johnson's message was irrelevant. Id. at 438. Instead, Justice Stevens focused
on "whether those who view the act will take serious offense." Id.; see Dyer, supra note 37,
at 918-19. The author notes Justice Steven's argument that Texas' statute was content-
neutral and Johnson's message was irrelevant. Id.; Fine, supra note 50, at 791-93. Fine
concludes that Johnson's mode of conveyance was offensive aspect. Id. But see Greenawalt,
supra note 6, at 929-30. Greenwalt asserts that Johnson's conduct easily met the Spence
requirement because the "burning of a revered symbol antagonized, but it also communi-
cated a strong message." Id.
106 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 438 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing flag burning with van-
dalizing government monument).
107 See McBride, supra note 96, at 308 (noting that, in analyzing "intangible dimension"
of flag, neither dissent acknowledged that monument is not owned by defacer as flag often
is owned by burner).
108 See, e.g., Michelle Battle, Poll: 69% Want Flag Protected, USA TODAY, June 23, 1989,
at 1A (illustrating vast public support for flag burning amendment); Tamar Jacoby, A Fight
for Old Glory: The Supreme Court Rules that Flag-Burning is Not a Crime--Sparking Out-
rage Across the Nation, NEwSWEEK, July 3, 1989, at 18 (noting that, in response to poll
asking "[wiould you support a new constitutional amendment that would make flag-burn-
ing illegal?" 71% said "yes," and 24% said 'no").
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the Court's decision.109 President Bush declared that the Court
had erred in its decision and recognized the need for a constitu-
tional amendment to protect the flag." 0O
Congress attempted to pass such an amendment to override the
Court's decision."' The proposed amendment would have pro-
vided Congress with the power to prohibit the physical desecra-
tion of the flag. 1 2 Exactly one year after Johnson, however, the
amendment failed in the House of Representatives,1 3 negating
the need for Senate consideration. " 4 Nevertheless, the Senate,
choosing to vote on the amendment anyway, also failed to obtain
the requisite two-thirds majority. 115
109 See Jacoby, supra note 108, at 18 (reporting that Newsweek Poll by Gallup showed
71% of public supported amendment protecting flag).
110 See BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 2, at 191 (stating that, although he insisted upon
necessity of amendment, President Bush signed Flag Protection Act of 1989 into law); John
Dfllin, Bush's Call Sparks Ardent Debate: Defenders of Old Glory Undermine First Amend-
ment Guarantees, Cautious Voices Warn, CmusTLAN Sci. MONITOR, July 6, 1989, at 8 (not-
ing President Bush's belief that flag burning amendment as worded protected flag while
preserving "widest conceivable range of options for free expression").
111 See Tom Kenworthy, Flag Amendment Fails in Decisive House Vote; Year-Long Fight
on Desecration Put to Rest, WASH. POST, June 22, 1990, at Al. This article reports that in
response to Johnson, the House held an emotionally charged seven hour debate concerning
amendment. Id. Criticism of Congress' attempts to override Supreme Court decisions fol-
lowed. See generally Paul Brest, Congress as a Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power
to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REv. 57, 98-100 (1986). Professor Brest favors the
independent Judiciary to "legislators who are most intimately involved in the decision-
making process [and] often have publicly committed themselves to a particular position
.... " Id. at 100; David L. Faigman, By What Authority?: Reflections on the Constitutional-
ity and Wisdom of the Flag Protection Act of 1989, 17 HASTINGS CON. L. Q. 353, 353-54
(1990). Faigman points to Congress' timidity, irresolute vision and lack of integrity. Id.;
Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 927. Greenawalt feels that the obsession about flag burning
panders to an uninformed public and reflects cowardice in confronting hard problems. Id.
But see Tiefer, supra note 6, at 359. As Deputy General Counsel to the Clerk of the U.S.
House of Representatives, Tiefer commends the self-restraint demonstrated by Congress,
and defends Congress' vital role in constitutional issues. Id.
112 See S.J. Res. 332, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S8632 (1990). The text of the
proposal provided: "The Congress and the States shall have the power to prohibit the physi-
cal desecration of the flag of the United States." Id.
113 See 136 CONG. REC. S8632 (1990) (statement of Sen. Biden) (noting that on June 21,
1990, by vote of 254 in favor and 177 against, amendment failed in House by only 34 votes);
see also Harvey, supra note 27, at Al (embracing arguments of Democratic leaders and
despite last minute lobbying by President Bush, House refused to erode free-speech protec-
tion of Bill of Rights for first time); Steven A. Holmes, Amendment to Bar Flag Desecration
Fails in the House, N.Y. TuMEs, June 22, 1990, at Al (documenting vote); Kenworthy, supra
note 111, at A01 (reporting that House vote followed emotional seven-hour debate).
114 See Tiefer, supra note 6, at 365-66 (discussing debate before vote in Senate as to
whether constitutional amendment or more carefully constructed federal statute was re-
quired to override Supreme Court's decision).
115 See 136 CONG. REc. S8693-04 (1990); see also Tiefer, supra note 6, at 378 (noting that
Senate rejected amendment by only 58 to 42 margin).
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In response to the Supreme Court's declaration that flag dese-
cration statutes violate the First Amendment, 116 Congress passed
the Flag Protection Act of 1989.117 In an effort to get away from
the expressive element of the Act, Congress replaced "casts con-
tempt upon any flag of the United States by publicly mutilating,
defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon it shall be fined not
more than $1,000. . ." with "mutilates, defaces, physically defiles,
burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag
of the United States shall be fined under this title .... ,1"s The
drafters of the Act sought to avoid implicating the First Amend-
ment by removing the focus on offensive, communicative conduct
from the statute. 11 9 The Act was designed in part to avoid the con-
tent-based label, with hopes of swaying Justices Scalia and Ken-
116 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989); see H.R. REP. No. 101-231, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1989); S. REP. No. 101-152, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989), 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
612 (demonstrating legislative history of this responsive action). See generally Hearings on
Measures to Protect the Physical Integrity of the American Flag, Hearings Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-754; Statutory and Consti-
tutional Responses to the Supreme Court Decision in Texas v. Johnson, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Rep-
resentatives, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-572 (1989).
117 Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988)). The Act
provides in pertinent part:
(aX1) Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, bums, maintains on
the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
(a2) This subsection does not prohibit any conduct consisting of the disposal of a flag
when it has become worn or soiled ....
(b) As used in this section, the term 'flag of the United States' means any flag of the
United States, or any part thereof, made of any substance, of any size, in a form that is
commonly displayed.
18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 1990).
118 Id.
119 See 18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (1988). The Act replaced the former flag-burning statute that
prohibited, "knowingly cast[ing] contempt" upon any flag of the United States. Id.; United
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 314 n.3. (1990). In Eichman, the government contended
that the new Act was constitutional because it did not target expressive conduct based on
its content. Id. at 315. The Court, however, disagreed and found that the new statute was
unconstitutional because it unnecessarily infringed upon First Amendment rights. Id. at
318; Katherine F. Rowe, Visual Artists and the First Amendment; Moral Rights; Resale
Royalties, in LAw AND Busnass op ART 318 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Liter-
ary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3851, 1990). The author states that the Act at-
tempts to delete all references to motive or to effect upon onlookers. Id.; S. Kathryn Spruill,
Comment, Old Glory and Flag Protection Legislation: Can Congress Wrap Itself in the Flag
Without Getting Burned?, 95 Dicta L. REv. 407, 416-17. The old Act applied regardless of
whether the offender burned the flag out of disrespect or admiration, excluding only burn-
ing of, in compliance with tradition, worn flags. Id. See generally R. Neil Taylor III, Case-
note, The Protection of Flag Burning as Symbolic Speech and the Congressional Attempt to
Overturn the Decision: Texas v. Johnson, 58 U. Cnr. L. REV. 1477, 1500-08 (1990) The au-
thor criticizes Professor Tribe's testimony at the Senate Judiciary Committee as lackluster.
Id.; Tiefer, supra note 6, at 365-68. The author documents arguments made before House
and Senate Judiciary Committees.
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nedy to align with the Johnson dissenters. 120 In addition, unlike
the Texas statute struck down in Johnson, the 1989 Act avoided
the issue of offense to bystanders. 121
The Act was tested immediately upon becoming law.122 Within
forty-eight hours of its enactment, individuals protesting various
aspects of foreign and domestic policy and the Flag Protection Act
of 1989, set fire to several American flags on the steps of the
United States Capitol.' 23 The Supreme Court addressed the First
Amendment implications of the protestors in light of the Flag Pro-
tection Act. In United States v. Eichman,2 4 the Supreme Court
ruled that the Flag Protection Act was unconstitutional as it ap-
plied to those protestors. 25 Although the Court admitted that the
government has a legitimate interest in preserving the flag's func-
tion as an "incident of sovereignty," 26 the majority held that the
Act was content-based and suppressed expression.' 27 Although
120 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420-21 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated:
And I agree that the flag holds a lonely place of honor in an age when absolutes are
distrusted and simple truths are burdened by unneeded apologetics.
With all respect to those views, I do not believe the Constitution gives us the right to
rule as the dissenting Members of the Court urge, however painful this judgment is to
announce .... It is poignant but fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it
in contempt.
Id. at 421; see also McBride, supra note 96, at 305 (stating that Act was allegedly "content
neutral," and its enforcement did not "turn on communicative impact").
121 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 1990); see McBride, supra note 96, at 305 (stating that legisla-
tive history of Act illustrates that legislators took into account difference between bystand-
ers' reaction and actor's intention).
122 See David Cole, Flagging Issue for Mr. Bush, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 20, 1989, at 13 (noting
that at 12:01 a.m. on day Act became law, Johnson, Eichman and others burned flag in
New York, but were not arrested until they burned flag two days later in Washington,
D.C.).
123 Eichman, 496 U.S. at 312.
124 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (consolidating two cases challenging Act); see United States y.
Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (finding government interest in protecting
flag insufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny test); United States v. Eichman, 731 F. Supp 1123
(D.D.C. 1990) (finding Flag Protection Act unconstitutional), ald, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
125 Eichman, 496 U.S. at 319; see also United States v. Eichman, 731 F. Supp. 1123,
1125 (1990). Gregory Lee Johnson was among those arrested, but he was not charged be-
cause his flag failed to ignite. Id.; FACTS ON FILE, Nov. 17, 1989, at 862, B3. Johnson felt
that dropping the charges against him was an act of "cowardice on the part of Bush and the
administration." Id. Continuing the sentiments of Johnson, the Court stated that
"[plunishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very freedom that makes this emblem so
revered, and worth revering." Id.
126 Eichman, 496 U.S. at 316 n.6 (noting "flag's 'historic function' for such sovereign pur-
poses as marking 'our national presence (quoting Brief for Speaker and Leadership Group
of U.S. House of Representatives as Amicis Curiae at 25)); see Tiefer, supra note 6, at 372-
76. Professor Tiefer believes the Court was too quick to discard the original intent of the
Framers. Id. at 373. "The Framers would have understood such sovereignty-related func-
tions to require punishment for defiling the flag, based on English, early colonial, and late
colonial precedents." Id. at 373-74 (citations omitted).
127 Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315.
864 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:843
the asserted government interest was in the symbol of the flag, 1 28
because the Act provided for burning as "proper disposal," the Act
only prohibited burnings expressing disapproval of the United
States, the government, or the flag itself. 129 Thus, the Court held
in both Johnson and Eichman that the First Amendment rights of
free expression outweighed any governmental interest in preserv-
ing the flag as a national symbol.1 30
VI. RENEWED INTEREST IN BANNING FLAG DESECRATION
The support for a flag desecration amendment has experienced
a rebirth. 131 The latest proposed amendment reads: "The Con-
gress and the States shall have the power to prohibit the physical
desecration of the flag of the United States."'32 On June 28, 1995,
the House voted 312 to 120 in support of the amendment. 133 On
July 20, 1995, the Senate Judiciary Committee passed the mea-
sure by a vote of 12 to 6.13 On December 13, 1995, however, the
amendment fell three votes shy of the required two-thirds major-
128 Id. at 317-18.
129 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1990); see also David Dyroff, Legis-
lative Attempts to Ban Flag Burning, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1023, 1027 (1991). Dyroff thinks
that legislatures would be required to justify statutes with governmental purposes impli-
cated by any burning, not only burning to express anti-U.S. views. But see Eichman, 496
U.S. at 321-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and O'Connor, Justice Stevens felt that Congress had the power to impose the minor
limitation on Eichman of removing one of the myriad methods of expression open to him.
Id. at 322. He also believed the government had a legitimate interest in preserving the flag
as a unique symbol. Id. at 321. The flag "uniquely symbolizes the ideas of liberty, equality,
and tolerance-ideas that Americans have passionately defended and debated throughout
our history. The flag embodies the spirit of our national commitment to those ideals." Id.
130 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 391, 418 (1989). The Johnson Court held that the
government's interest in preserving this national symbol cannot justify the criminal pun-
ishment of political protestors. Id.; Eichman, 496 U.S. at 314 (1990). The Eichman Court
concluded that the state interests asserted did not justify the infringement upon First
Amendment rights. Id.; see also Cary v. United States, 498 U.S. 916, 916 (1990). Cary
presented the Court with a final chance to alter its stance on the flag issue. Cary burned
the flag in Minneapolis in 1988 and threw the burning flag into an Armed Services Recruit-
ment Center. Id.; Cary v. United States, 897 F.2d 917, 918-19 (8th Cir. 1990). Although the
state courts felt the case was distinguishable from Eichman, the Supreme Court refused to
consider it, and remanded to the Eighth Circuit, advising the court to conform to the hold-
ing in Eichman. 498 U.S. 916.
131 See Dole Attacks Clinton in Flag Burning: GOP Candidate Supports Measure to Bar
the Protest, BOSTON GLOBE, June 15, 1996, at 9 (illustrating politicians awareness of vast
popular support for flag).
132 See Seelye, supra note 13, at Al (quoting amendment proposal).
133 See id. at Al, A19. Ninety-three Democrats joined the 219 Republicans to surpass the
280 votes that constitute a two-thirds majority of the House. Id. at Al. Twelve Republicans,
107 Democrats and one independent were in opposition. Id.
134 See Tom Diemer, Senate Panel OKs Flag Desecration Ban, Thx PLAN DEALER (Cleve-
land), July 21, 1995, at 12A (documenting full senate vote).
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ity of the full Senate. 135 Supporters of the amendment vow that
the issue will persist.1 3
6
Based upon the resolutions presented at the House vote from
every state but Vermont, it appears that the states are eager to
ratify should congressional proponents succeed.' 3 7  Veterans
groups have invested millions of dollars and have produced count-
less signatures to ensure that the issue will not be forgotten. 38 In
fact, approximately one hundred organizations, including the
American Legion, the Knights of Columbus and the Fraternal Or-
der of the Police, have joined forces to create the Citizens Flag
Alliance. 13 9 The Alliance has unveiled a high-tech, $3.5 million
lobbying campaign in support of the amendment. 4 0
Major opponents of the proposed amendment include President
Clinton, 14 1 the American Bar Association14 2 and the American
Civil Liberties Union. 143 Opponents argue that flag desecration is
not a problem worthy of a constitutional amendment.' 44 Addition-
ally, opponents feel that only the Supreme Court, removed from
the pressures of our political system, can provide the proper forum
135 See Marcy Gordon, In Close Vote, Senate Defeats Amendment Banning Flag Burning,
Assoc. PRESS POL. SERV., Dec. 12, 1995 (reporting 63 votes for and 36 against amendment).
136 See id. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) stated: "This
amendment is not going to go away." Id.
137 See Melissa Healy, House Panel Oks Proposal to Ban Flag Burning, L.A. TmsS, May
26, 1995, at 4. Rep. Gerald B.H. Solomon (R-N.Y.) predicts this amendment "will be ratified
faster than any other constitutional amendment put before the American people." Id.; See-
lye, supra note 13, at A19 (noting resolutions at House vote of every state but Vermont).
138 See Political Ads Urge Spector to Support Flag Burning Amendment, Assoc. PRESS
POL. SERV., Nov. 25, 1995 (discussing Citizen Flag Alliance advertisement campaign).
139 See Chapman, supra note 54, at 3 (describing make-up of Alliance); see also Christo-
pher Drew, High-Tech Lobbying Heats Up Flag Burning Amendment, Cm. Tam., Mar. 4,
1995, at 1 (noting that American Legion, nation's largest veterans' group, alone has 3.2
million members).
140 See Drew, supra note 139, at 1. The coalition is using satellite hookups to convey its
message and computer databases to mobilize support. Id. The Alliance has also hired Jim
McAvoy of Burson-Marsteller, one of the largest public relations firms in the country. Id.
141 See Ann Devroy, Entering Fray, Administration to Announce Opposition to Flag-
Burning Amendment, WASH. POST, June 6, 1995, at A4. President Clinton's position has
political, but little practical effect, for he cannot veto a proposed amendment. Id. Clinton
has stated that he is against a flag burning amendment, but he has also been careful to
speak vaguely on the issue and not to rule out that an amendment to the Constitution may
be necessary to protect the flag in light of the Court's decisions. Id.
142 See McMillion, supra note 27, at 110 (citing that ABA recognized problems with
amendment relating to scope, First Amendment, and use of terms "desecration" and "flag").
143 See Drew, supra note 139, at 1 (listing obstacles flag desecration amendment must
overcome).
144 See Bradley Goodson, July Letter of the Month Focuses on Flag Burning Proposal,
NEws TRm. (Tacoma, Wa.), Aug. 6, 1995, at F5 (proposing that since Bill of Rights, many
constitutional amendments have been frivolous, and sarcastically noting that now Con-
gress is attempting to save us from "the epidemic of flag burning").
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for determining such a highly emotional issue. 145 Finally, in addi-
tion to the theoretical problems facing the proposed amendment,
serious practical problems will arise as individual states begin to
interpret the terms "desecration" and "flag."146
The proposed flag burning amendment will continue to rear its
head, and the American public must be aware of the grave conse-
quences associated with the support of such a drastic measure.
Whenever a fundamental right comes under attack, Americans
must, armed with all of the facts at issue, carefully scrutinize the
repercussions of their vote and the permanence of their power.
The proposed flag burning amendment is wrought with theoretical
and practical problems to serious to allow it overnight passage
into the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The Framers intended Article V to be a device empowering fu-
ture legislatures to improve and expand upon the freedoms enu-
merated in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The utilization
of Article V's amendment powers to limit a fundamental right,
guaranteed by the First Amendment, runs counter to the intent of
the Framers and the sphit of the Constitution. Contrary to what
eager politicians and patriotic veterans assert, the flag is not in
need of constitutional protection. To feel strongly about the flag,
the very embodiment of our nation, proves noble and just, but to
compromise the fundamental principles for which both the flag
and our nation stand proves myopic and hypocritical. Time and
energy is better spent on nurturing and protecting that above
which we raise our immortal flag.
Troy G. Pieper
145 See Justice Craig Enoch, Foreword, 48 SMU L. REv. 723, 735 n.27 (1995). Justice
Enoch argues that the flag burning issue ideally should be left up to an independent judici-
ary capable of affording adequate consideration to constitutional freedoms. Id. Detachment
from the popular sentiments and interests of society allows the judiciary "a more authorita-
tive claim to represent the true principles and aspirations of society." Id.
146 See, e.g., Seelye, supra note 13, at A17. Rep. John Bryant (D. Texas) urged the sup-
porters of the amendment to adopt language that would define desecration as "burning,
soiling, trampling or rending the flag." Id. His attempt failed, 63 to 369. Id. Rep. Gary
Ackerman (D.-N.Y.) produced on the floor several flag related "knickknacks" and asked if
the nation was ready to prosecute the manufacturers, purchasers and wearers of such flag
related items. Id.; cf. 4 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The statute provides the design and exact dimen-
sions of the American flag. Id.
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